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A PERMANENT SOLUTION FOR PRODUCT LIABILITY





There is a French phrase, Plus ca change, c'est la meme chose, which
translates: "The more things change, the more they remain the same.",
This is indeed applicable to the most recent product liability crisis. The
basic causes have changed little. The 1970s had its own product liability
crisis and at that time the federal government created the Federal Inter-
agency Task Force on Product Liability, chaired by the Department of
Commerce, to examine the product liability system and the reasons for
its failure. 2 After eighteen months of study, the Task Force found two
basic causes of the product liability crisis that occurred in the 1976-1978
period - uncertainties and unpredictability in tort law, and overly sub-
jective insurance pricing. 3 Other causes, such as the increase in the
number and complexity of products, and product misuse, also were
noted.
4
Congress addressed the product liability insurance aspect in 1981
by passing the Federal Product Liability Risk Retention Act. 5 This Act
states, in plain language, that if a small business, or group of businesses,
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1. J. BARTLETT, BARTLETr'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 514 (15th ed. 1980) (quoting Al-
phonse Karr, Les Guepes (anvier 1849)).
2. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL
REPORT (1977) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
3. Id. at 1-21-24, 26-29. The Task Force also identified unsafe manufacturing prac-
tices by some manufacturers as a cause of the product liability problem. The Task Force
suggested the use of product liability prevention techniques in the area of manufacturers'
quality control and greater economic incentives to reduce risk as means of helping to solve
the problem.
4. Id. at 1-29-31.
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-04 (1981). The Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981
helped to alleviate the insurance rate-making problem by permitting businesses to form
self-insurance cooperatives or to band together as purchasing groups to bargain collec-
tively for insurance rates. This legislation was designed to encourage commercial insurers
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believe that the insurance pricing mechanism is unfair, they can set up
their own self-insurance groups. Some businesses have done so, but
most have not. The common sense explanation for the lukewarm recep-
tion to this legislation is that the uncertainties and unpredictability in
our tort law remain unaddressed. Nothing has yet been done about this
principal cause of the crisis, the same cause that existed a decade ago
when the Task Force issued its Final Report in 1978.
I. THE UNPREDICTABILITY PROBLEM
Unpredictability lies at the heart of product liability crises. Dramatic
and unpredictable changes in tort law rules have made it difficult, if not
impossible, for insurers to accurately price various classes of liability in-
surance. Commercial general liability insurers, in particular, have had
great difficulty pricing their product because the insured's risks are sub-
ject to continuous change in both scope and size.
6
Product liability law, for the most part, is common law. It has been
developed by judges and juries sitting in state courts. Thus, the rules
vary from state to state, and sometimes from case to case within each
state. Because the rules of liability are constantly changing, an insured's
exposure to liability for damages cannot be predicted with any degree of
precision. A judicial decision expanding tort law liability may subject
the insured to new types of claims that could not have been brought or
anticipated when the insurance policy was originally written. For exam-
ple, some courts have decided that a person can bring a tort claim
merely because they watched someone else being injured. 7 There is no
way for an insurer to anticipate this kind of occurrence.
Constantly changing rules mean that looking at an insured's past
claims experience does not give the complete picture in assessing that
insured's future risks and in determining the corresponding price that
must be set for liability insurance premiums. Similarly, data regarding
past losses for a particular class of risks, for instance drug companies,
may be insufficient for setting today's commercial liability insurance pre-
miums for that class of policy holders. In addition to merely evaluating
past losses, changes in tort law and cases involving this class and related
classes of insureds must also be considered.
The common law has always been flexible and subject to change.
to offer product liability insurance at competitive rates and to set premiums more
accurately.
6. The problems in the insurance industry have generated much debate. See, e.g.,
Availability and Affordability Problems in Liability Insurance: Hearing before Subcommittee on Busi-
ness, Trade and Tourism of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. Serial no. 99-567 (1985); Availability and Affordability of Liability Insurance:
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
Serial no. 99-633 (1986).
7. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)
(mother who witnessed child run down by an automobile and killed could recover for
emotional distress even though the mother herself was not in physical danger); Culbert v.
Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982) (mother watched baby gag on
substance in baby food).
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However, in the past, the common law moved in small steps or incre-
mentally. Today, fundamentals can fall in a day. There are numerous
examples of judicial decisions that create massive potential liability -
decisions setting forth new rules which are sometimes retroactively
applied.8
1. Strict-Strict Liability
Some courts have decided that a product manufacturer may be held
liable for risks that it could not have discovered by any scientific means
which might have been available at the time the product was made. 9
These decisions go beyond strict liability as it was developed in the
1960s and 1970s. Originally, strict liability allowed the claimant to pre-
vail even though he or she did not prove that the defendant was negli-
gent. '0 Nevertheless, fault remained as a basic ingredient in the lawsuit.
Fault arose both in the test that led to proving the product was defective,
and in permitting defendants to show that they neither knew nor could
have known about the product's risk." The few courts that apply
"strict-strict" liability do not permit defendants to show that the risk was
not knowable at the time the product was made. While the new "strict-
strict" liability rule has only been adopted in a few states, it has created
an area of severe instability in liability law. If manufacturers are held
responsible for risks that could not have been known at the time of manufac-
ture, their exposure is completely open-ended. Thus, risks that are dis-
coverable because of new scientific technology create enormous
potential liability for products manufactured years ago. And, liability for
8. When a decision adopts a new rule of liability or otherwise modifies product liabil-
ity law, the new law applies to the product involved in the case - a product that may have
been manufactured many years ago. The new rules apply to conduct that occurred in the
past. Thus, in this sense, the rules may be retroactively applied.
9. "Strict-strict" liability, for the purposes of this article, refers to a heightened form of
strict liability which imposes a duty on manufacturers to assume the cost of damages
caused by unreasonably dangerous products. See, e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg. Inc., 147 Ariz.
242, 709 P.2d 876 (1985) (a strict liability design defect case in which knowledge of risks
known at time of trial was imputed to a manufacturer regardless of whether the risks were
knowable at the time the product was made); Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484
So. 2d 110, 114 (La. 1986) (holding that the manufacturer's ability to know of product's
danger was irrelevant if the "product is unreasonably dangerous per se," that is, one which
"a reasonable person would conclude that the danger-in-fact of the product, whether fore-
seeable or not, outweighs the utility of the product .. "); Hayes v. Ariens Co., 391 Mass.
407, 462 N.E.2d 273 (1984) (In a case alleging that the manufacturer of a snowblower
breached its warranty of marketability, the court held that adequacy of warning is mea-
sured by all risks presented by the product regardless of whether manufacturer actually
knew or should have known of such risks.); Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434
(Mo. 1984) (in a design defect case alleging that asbestos insulation material was defec-
tively designed, the "state of the art" defense not allowed); Phillips v. Kimwood Machine
Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974) (knowledge of risks available at time of trial was
imputed to manufacturer in evaluating reasonableness of product's design or warning
under strict liability theory); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447
A.2d 539 (1982) (a strict liability case for failure to warn of asbestos dangers in which the
"state of the art" defense was not allowed).
10. See generally Smith, Tort and Absoltte Liability, 30 HARV. L. REV. 241, 319, 409
(1917); HAPER, LAw OF TORTS §§ 155, 203 (1933).
11. Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEx. L. REV. 777 (1983).
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these risks was impossible to predict at the time insurance premiums
were set and insurance contracts were signed.
In 1982, the seminal decision imposing "strict-strict" liability was
handed down by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Products Corp., a case involving asbestos litigation.12 The court
in Beshada held that culpability is irrelevant in strict liability cases and,
thus, state-of-the-art defenses are not allowable.' 3 The New Jersey
court, however, engaged in a partial retreat in 1984, limiting the effect
of its earlier decision. 14 Meanwhile, the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts 15 and the Supreme Court of Arizona 16 had already applied
the original Beshada decision to a snowplow and a machine tool, respec-
tively. To the surprise of many experts, "strict-strict" liability was also
recently applied in Louisiana.1 7 Clearly then, "strict-strict" liability may
be applied in any jurisdiction. However, even if adopted, there always
remains the possibility of principle retreat, as evidenced by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey. Whenever decisions of this type arise, insurance
carriers must examine all existing reserves for pending claims and aug-
ment those reserves when appropriate. Further, carriers must reserve
funds for additional future claims likely to be reported because of such
decisions.
These courts have not only changed the rules of liability so that a
manufacturer can be liable even for dangers that were undiscoverable at
the time the product was made, but they have changed the liability rules
without any alteration of tort damage rules which are based on fault.
Instead, they have required unknowing manufacturers to pay damages
in the same manner as those manufacturers who have acted wrongfully.
The basic predicate for these decisions is that the manufacturer is "per-
ceived" to be in a position to absorb the costs of accidents. For exam-
ple, the Supreme Court of Louisiana stated:
Of course, some losses from scientifically unknowable dangers
may prove to be uninsurable for producers also. Manufactur-
ers as a class, however, are still in a better position than con-
sumers to analyze and take action to avoid the risk, to negotiate
for broader insurance coverage, and to pass losses on in the
form of price increases. 18
The premises underlying this statement may not be true. First,
many tort claimants have already received a substantial share of their out-
12. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
13. Id. Accordingly, the defendant could not base its defense on the fact that the med-
ical community was unaware of the dangers of asbestos.
14. See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984) (in the
typical design defect or warning case, the issue of whether the manufacturer knew, or
should have known, of the dangerous propensity of its product, is relevant).
15. Hayes v. Ariens Co., 391 Mass. 407, 462 N.E.2d 273 (1984).
16. Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 147 Ariz. 242, 709 P.2d 876 (1985).
17. See Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986) (manufac-
turer held liable for injuries caused by product deemed dangerous per se, even though the
manufacturer could not have known of any danger).
18. Id. at 118-19.
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of-pocket costs through workers' compensation, or health and accident
insurance. 19 Second, accident insurance is a much more efficient form
of spreading risks than liability insurance - more of the premiums end
up in the hands of the injured party under health and accident insur-
ance. 20 Finally, many businesses cannot afford to absorb the costs of
"strict-strict" liability and cannot obtain affordable insurance in an at-
tempt to do so.
2. Liability Without Defect
Until recently, liability has been imposed only in cases where the
product was defective, 2 l that is, something had to be "wrong" with the
product. A recent decision, however, shows that even this rule is not
inviolable.2 2 The Maryland Court of Appeals recently held that a manu-
facturer of a "Saturday night special" handgun may be held liable for
the shooting of a person in a grocery store robbery. 23 Traditionally,
courts have held that a gun manufacturer may be liable only if there is a
"defect" in the gun; for example, if it were mismanufactured and parts
were missing or parts were assembled improperly, or if the gun did not
include an effective safety device. 24 In the Maryland case, however, the
court held that liability could be imposed, not because there was any
defect in the gun, but because the particular type of handgun at issue (in
the court's subjective view) had no legitimate purpose and the manufac-
turer "[knew] or ought to [have] know[n] that the chief use of the prod-
uct is for criminal activity."'2 5 Interestingly, in a further demonstration
of the legal instability of product liability law, a court in California held
for the same defendant manufacturer because there was no defect in the hand-
gun, the opposite ruling reached by the Maryland court. 26 The Mary-
land decision, imposing liability without a showing that the product was
defective, created a completely new area of exposure for manufacturers.
This type of extreme change in the law could not be foreseen by the
insurer at the time it insures the gun manufacturer. The underlying
principle of the decision could conceivably allow liquor manufacturers
19. See HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE DATA 3 (1984 update); U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COM-
PENSATION LAWS 1 (1985).
20. See Schwartz, Tort Law Re]orrn: Strict Liability and the Collateral Source Rule Do Not M.ix,
39 VAND. L. REV. 569, 573-74 (1986).
21. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99 (W.P. Keeton 5th ed. 1984); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
22. Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985).
23. Id.
24. See W. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 41 (1980); Wade, A Conspectus of Manufacturers' Liability for Products,
10 IND. L. REV. 755, 756-57 (1977).
25. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1159.
26. See Moore v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 789 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1986). The court in
Moore, contrasting the decision in Kelley, supra note 22, concluded that "there [was] no
indication in California law or public policy that the courts would distinguish 'Saturday
night specials' from other handguns or find them of so little utility that the risk of injury
outweighs their beneficial uses for recreation or protection." Moore, 789 F.2d at 1327.
1988]
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to be liable for alcoholism, sellers of sugar liable for tooth decay, and
fast food hamburger restaurants liable for fostering heart disease!
3. Liability Without Injury
A federal court in Mississippi recently permitted recovery for a for-
mer shipyard worker's medical probability of developing cancer in the
future.2 7 Not only could a claim be brought for mental stress relating to
the fear of getting cancer, but a claim also could be brought for the
"probability" of getting cancer in the future. 28 Both bases of recovery
are a major departure from traditional tort doctrine. 29 The potential
liability exposure caused by persons who worry about suffering an illness
they might get in the future is limitless.
In another non-injury case, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma re-
cently decided that a woman could recover a substantial tort judgment
because she noticed an object which turned out to be a piece of "Good-
n-Plenty" candy in a soda bottle.3 0 Again, she merely noticed the piece of
candy. It never touched her lips, it did not harm her, it merely made her
upset.
3 1
These examples of expanded liability and recovery, under "strict-
strict" liability, liability without defect, and liability without injury, rep-
resent a dangerous trend. Notice that in the expansion of liability under
the first category, the innocent pays. In the second example, liability can
be imposed when there is no defect or anything wrong with the product.
In the third example, a person can recover when he or she has no tradi-
tionally-recognized present injury. Consequently, if a court were ever to
combine these rules, a person could recover tort damages even when
there has been no fault, no defect, and no injury!
4. What Is Next? An Example of How One Case Could
Radically Change Liability Exposure
There may be other types of tort liability that cannot even be fore-
seen at this time. With tort law constantly in flux, it is impossible to
predict the new areas of liability which courts may create. For example,
some plaintiffs' attorneys have asserted that an automobile which does
not contain an air bag is defective.3 2 No appellate judicial decision has
27. See Jackson v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986) (evidence
showed that the plaintiff, who currently was suffering asbestosis, had a greater than 50%
chance of getting cancer), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986).
28. Jackson, 781 F.2d at 411-12.
29. Id. at 414-15; see Gale & Goyer, Recovery for Cancerphobia and Increased Risk of Cancer,
15 CUMB. L. REV. 723 (1985).
30. See Ellington v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 717 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1986).
31. Id. at 109. Plaintiff, upon noticing what she thought was a worm in her soft drink
bottle, but which actually was the piece of candy, became physically ill, the complications
of which resulted in "a kidney infection and other physical irregularities such as diarrhea,
fever and nausea." Id.
32. See, e.g., Vanover v. Ford Motor Co., 632 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (The
district court granted the manufacturer's motion for partial summary judgment on two
grounds: (1) the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. § 1392
[Vol. 64:4
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upheld this theory.3 3 Nevertheless, the potential liability that would be
created if a series of judicial decisions held that an automobile without
an air bag was defective could impose catastrophic liability damages on
motor vehicle manufacturers and their insurers.
There are approximately 45,000 motor vehicle highway deaths each
year.3 4 Only a small fraction of these deaths are caused by defective
motor vehicles.3 5 Most accidents are caused by driver error such as
speeding and intoxication.3 6 In those cases in which an injury is attribu-
table to a defective motor vehicle, it is usually limited to a specific model
of a specific make of car manufactured by a particular motor vehicle
manufacturer. Therefore, in those situations where a court determines
that a particular model of car is defective, the total number of vehicles
with such a defective design or component is only a small fraction of the
total number of motor vehicles in use. In contrast, if courts should hold
that motor vehicles without air bag systems are defective, 100 million
cars would immediately be defective, resulting in the creation of poten-
tial liability for automobile manufacturers for all deaths and injuries in
which air bag systems could have, arguably, reduced or prevented injury.
This potential liability is speculative. In assessing the liability risks
of automobile manufacturers, insurance companies can only guess as to
whether and when this type of liability might be applied. The absence of
any past data on this type of liability and the impossibility of predicting
judicial behavior makes it difficult to factor this potential liability into
the exposure to liability that is considered when setting premiums.
Opponents to federal product liability legislation have pointed to
this "absence of claims data" as a reason to take no action to reform the
tort system.3 7 But what good are claims data in an area where the future
may have relatively little to do with the past? The hunt for perfect
(1982), preempted any state motor vehicle standards; and (2) under the "second collision"
doctrine first announced in Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968),
an automobile without a defective airbag could not be considered unreasonably
dangerous.).
33. See, e.g., Evers v. General Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984 (11 th Cir. 1985).
34. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, COMPENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS 1 (1985)
[hereinafter ACCIDENT VICTIMS]. The losses - in human and economic terms - are stag-
gering. In 1982, for example, there were 46,000 motor vehicle deaths and 1.7 million
disabling injuries. The economic cost to society arising from all motor vehicle accidents in
1982 totalled $41.6 billion. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 40 (1983). This
amount included losses from medical expenses, insurance administration, wage loss, mo-
tor vehicle property damage, fire loss and indirect work loss. ACCIDENT VICTIMS at 4.
35. See NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 48 (1983). In 1982, for example,
vehicle defects were cited in only eight percent of fatal motor vehicle accidents occurring
in urban areas. Most of these "defects" were not of the type attributable to manufactures,
but rather to inadequate owner- performed maintenance such as balding or under-inflated
tires, improperly maintained brakes or non-working headlights. Id.
36. According to the National Safety Council, in 1982 improper driving accounted for
62.3% of all fatal highway accidents in urban areas, and 31.5% were caused by speeding.
Id. Alcohol has been cited as a factor in more than 50% of fatal motor vehicle accidents.
Id. at 52.
37. See S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 107-11 (1986) (minority views of Sen.
Ernest F. Hollings); 132 CONG. REC. S12,756 (daily ed. September 17, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Hollings).
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claims data is a misplaced and misleading enterprise. Product liability
tort law is not like life insurance or accident insurance in which the past
tells us a good deal about what will happen in the future. Product liabil-
ity laws are constantly changing, opening up new areas of potential lia-
bility. Unless the system is stabilized and reasonable uniform federal
rules are enacted, we will continue to have severe instability, and insur-
ance availability and affordability problems will not abate. That is one
reason why the Federal Product Liability Retention Act, which facilitates
self-insurance,3 8 has not been utilized by many businesses. The uncer-
tainties are the same for all, self-insured and commercially-insured alike.
The one thing certain about the past in product liability is that hindsight
alone will not predict the future.
II. FAIRNESS
The current system, in which the rules establishing a manufacturer's
obligation and an injured person's right to compensation vary depend-
ing upon which state's law applies, is inherently unfair. There is one
basic idea that provides the overriding rationale for a federal product
liability law: product liability rules should be the same in every state.
Products constantly move in interstate commerce. The liability of a
manufacturer or product seller should be determined by the same legal
standards no matter where the product is sold or where an injury occurs.
Accordingly, an injured person should have the same right to recovery
for harm no matter where that person resides, where the injury occurs,
or where an action for damages is brought. This rationale is based on
fairness, logic, simplicity and the nature of our commerce.
Because the rules vary from state to state and are continually in flux,
both manufacturers and claimants spend unnecessary time, effort and
resources in determining what the applicable legal rules are, and in in-
vestigating, pursuing and defending product liability claims. This diffi-
culty in evaluating the merits of a claim not only raises the costs of
litigation, but it inhibits the possibility of settlement.3 9 In many cases, it
is unclear what the legal standards are or should be, and this results in
excessive litigation. Legal costs and managerial time diverted by manu-
facturers to the assessment of legal claims are passed on to consumers in
the form of higher product prices. 40 Legal fees also devour judgments
won by claimants successful in product liability suits.
4 1
38. Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981, supra note 5, at §§ 3901-04. Under
the Risk Retention Act, a group of product manufacturers and sellers can form a self-
insurance group merely by being registered in one state. Id. at § 3901. Once chartered,
the group can then operate in other states by submitting certain information to the insur-
ance commissions of those states. Id. at § 3902. The Act also permits organizations, such
as trade associations, to purchase liability insurance on a group basis. Id. at § 3903. For a
brief discussion of the history and purpose of the Act see Home Warranty Corp. v. Elliot,
572 F. Supp. 1059 (D. Del. 1983).
39. See S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1984).
40. Id. at 8.
41. A recent study of 24,000 claims conducted by the Rand Corporation shows that
for every dollar received by a plaintiff in a product liability suit, $.41 is paid immediately to
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III. FROM COMMON LAw, To LEGISLATION, To FEDERAL LEGISLATION:
BACK To THE BASICS
Sometimes it is useful to go back to basics. For those of us who
have followed the issue for the past ten years, we can sometimes miss
the forest for the trees. We forget that product liability law today is
formed almost exclusively by courts on a day-to-day basis.4 2 Unfortu-
nately, the courts have gone a myriad of ways in formulating product
liability rules. The decisions are as diverse as the personalities of the
people who occupy the bench.43 With fifty-one sets of ever-changing
rules and thousands of courts, it is no wonder that the law is muddled.
While the common law worked well for many years in our country, it
does not do so in the product liability area anymore. It only worked well
when there was a "common morality." Decisions tended to move slowly
and clung to the past. Today, as has been illustrated, there are very
different views among judges about what the tort system should accom-
plish. On the other hand, there is a strong economic dependency in our
insurance system on having some stability, and congruity of interpreta-
tion, in those rules. This dependency did not exist at common law.
Consequently, it is clear that product liability law can no longer be left
to the vagaries of the common law - it must be put into a legislative
framework.
IV. WHY Is FEDERAL CURE NEEDED?
The states have not and cannot achieve uniformity of product liabil-
ity law. After a careful study of the product liability problem from 1976-
1978, a task force that one of the authors, Mr. Schwartz, chaired at the
United States Department of Commerce, drafted a model product liabil-
ity law, known as the Uniform Product Liability Act ("UPLA"). It was
published on October 31, 1979, and offered to the states as a basis for
action.
44
Despite this model act and efforts to have states act in a harmonious
manner, the result produced even more differences. Many states en-
acted their "own" version of a product liability law.4 5 Unlike the experi-
ence with the Uniform Commercial Code, there has been no harmony in
state legislation. Of equal importance is the fact that state statutes are
not comprehensive and fail to address key issues that arise in product
liability litigation. 46 For example, a key issue arising in product liability
the plaintiff's attorney. The defendant spends an additional $.58 in legal costs. Thus, for
every $.59 the plaintiff actually gets, lawyers get $.99. J. KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FEL-
STINER & M. SHANLEY, COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION (Institute for Civil Justice, July
1983).
42. See S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984).
43. Id.
44. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
45. State product liability legislation is compiled at 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 90,112-
95,270.
46. See S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1986).
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cases is the manufacturer's duty to provide warnings. 4 7 Must the manu-
facturer provide warnings directed to the product user or must the
warnings be given to a third party who will administer the product or
supervise its use, such as a physician or employer? This is an issue that
is not addressed in most state product liability statutes and, accordingly,
the answer is not always clear. This kind of lack of uniformity in the law
plagues the system. States are frustrated in this area because an average
of over seventy percent of all products are shipped outside their state of
origin.4 8 Thus, an attempt by one state to resolve uncertainties in its
tort litigation system can not affect the overwhelming majority of cases
that are brought in other states against their home-based industries.
Opponents of federal product liability legislation sometimes point to
state tort reforms and say that they have not resulted in lower insurance
prices. With regard to product liability, that is exactly why state reforms
cannot solve the problem. Legislation in one particular state is not ef-
fective to help manufacturers and product sellers in that state because
their products are frequently used in a number of other states. Most
importantly, product liability insurance rates are set on a nationwide ba-
sis. 4 9 Thus, the insurer is required to take into account the laws of
states other than the one where a particular product is manufactured.
There is no question that product liability is a matter of interstate
commerce. In fact, on this basis in August of 1986, the National Gover-
nors Association voted to reverse its former position in opposition to
federal product liability legislation. 50 We need legislation, and that leg-
islation must be federal.
V. CONGRESS HAS CLEAR AUTHORITY UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
To ENACT A FEDERAL PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW
The commerce clause gives the federal government the right and
responsibility to regulate and promote interstate commerce. 5 1 The pro-
duction, distribution and sale of products clearly takes place in and af-
fects interstate commerce. A product may be manufactured in one state
and sold or distributed in another state, contain components or raw
materials acquired in different states, or compete with other products in
interstate commerce. Improper findings of liability and excessive
awards impose a significant burden on interstate commerce. In addi-
tion, product liability insurance rates, as previously indicated, 52 are set
on a national basis. In assessing an insured's potential liability, insurers
must take into account a new rule extending liability in any state, be-
cause the insured's product may be subject to a lawsuit in that state, or
47. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99 (W.P. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
48. See 1977 CENSUS OF TRANSPORTATION, COMMODITY TRANSPORTATION SURVEY, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, TABLE I, pp. 1-77 (1981); see also S. REP. No.
422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1986).
49. See 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,716 (1979).
50. See Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 166, at A-2 (Aug. 27, 1986).
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
52. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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other states may follow the new rule. Thus, in this respect, product lia-
bility rules in an individual state affect interstate commerce and provide a
justification for federal regulation.
5 3
In general, federal legislation falls within Congress' commerce
clause authority if there is any rational basis for the congressional deter-
mination that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce. 54 The
current complex system of state common and statutory product liability
laws hampers trade among the states because products are subject to
varying and conflicting rules. Manufacturers who do business on an in-
terstate basis have no clear statement of what their legal obligations are
or what legal standards still apply. This very problem exemplifies the
reason for the commerce clause: to permit a uniform approach to
resolving issues that burden the conduct of business and trade across
state lines.
5 5
In the past, the national interest in protecting interstate commerce
has prompted Congress to find a uniform federal solution to problems
involving interstate commercial activity. 56 Congress has authority under
the commerce clause to enact laws determining the liability of parties for
injuries arising out of commerce, and it has enacted a number of statutes
that preempt state tort law. 5 7 Such laws may create or abolish causes of
action, add, subtract, or modify defenses for liability, and limit or ex-
pand liability.
58
The fact that tort law traditionally has been a matter of state law
does not alter Congress' authority under the commerce clause to enact a
uniform product liability law. The argument that in local product liabil-
ity laws the rules should be retained because the tort system traditionally
has been a feature of the common law has no constitutional basis. Con-
gress has clear authority under the commerce clause to enact a federal
product liability law.
53. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975) ("[E]ven activity that is purely
intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with
like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce.").
54. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981) (provisions of Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (1982), did not violate commerce clause, especially where legislative history ex-
pressed the need for uniform minimum nationwide standards).
55. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 8.1, at 261-62 (3rd ed.
1986).
56. See, e.g., United States Cotton Standards Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 51-65 (1982), Grain
Standards Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 71-87, 111, 113, 241-73, 2209 and 16 U.S.C. §§ 490, 683
(1982), Tobacco Inspection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 511-51 lq (1982) (requiring compliance with
uniform national classifications); Consumer Products Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083
and 5 U.S.C. §§ 5314, 5315 (1982) (uniform safety standards for consumer products);
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1982) (safety and labeling of drugs).
57. See, e.g., Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 901-50 (1984) (imposing liability without regard to fault); Price-Anderson Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2012, 2014, 2039, 2073, 2210, 2233, 2239 (1973 & Supp. 1983) (limiting liabil-
ity for nuclear power plant accidents); Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-
60 (1972) (governing the liability of interstate railway carriers to their employees and al-
tering state court law on available defenses).
58. S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1984).
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VI. FEDERAL LEGISLATION WILL ACHIEVE UNIFORM RULES OF
PRODUCT LIABILITY
Federal product liability legislation, Senate Bill 2760, reported to
the Floor by the Senate Commerce Committee in 1986,59 specifically
provides that such legislation would not create federal question jurisdic-
tion or jurisdiction based on an act of Congress regulating commerce.
60
In effect, the legislation leaves the resolution of product liability claims
to the state courts and federal courts that currently have jurisdiction
over such actions based upon diversity of citizenship. Some opponents
of the legislation have argued that uniformity will not be achieved under
a federal product liability act. 6 1 They contend that confusion and con-
flicting decisions will occur because state courts will have unbridled au-
thority to interpret the act without regard to the decisions of federal
courts. This contention is unfounded both as a theoretical and practical
matter.
62
Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution,
63
federal law overrides any conflicting provisions of state law. In inter-
preting federal law, state courts are guided by federal court decisions.
6 4
For example, in interpreting the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA), 6 5 state courts are bound to follow rulings of federal courts.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[m]anifestly the fed-
eral rights affording relief to injured railroad employees under a feder-
ally declared standard could be defeated if states were permitted to have
the final say as to what defenses could and could not be properly inter-
posed to suits under the Act."
'6 6
States have recognized their obligation to follow the decisions of
federal courts interpreting the FELA. 6 7 State courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with federal district courts to entertain FELA cases, but in
determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to recover in such cases,
courts "look to the prevailing federal case law."
'68
The importance of this rule as it applies to a federal product liability
59. See Product Liability Reform Act, S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
60. Id. at § 104; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337 (1982) (federal district court jurisdiction
over federal questions and acts of Congress regulating commerce, respectively).
61. See S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 73-75 (1984) (minority views of Sen.
Ernest F. Hollings).
62. There is a certain irony in the fact that some representatives of the organized bar
who argue this point also contend that the federal rules will make the law "rigid" and
"inflexible." One might conclude that these arguments are make-weights and that advo-
cates of these viewpoints simply do not wish to end a system that has been lucrative for the
legal profession.
63. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
64. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 45 (4th ed. 1983).
65. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
66. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952).
67. See, e.g., Kay v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 102 N.E.2d 855, 867 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951);
Grosse v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 307 Ill. App. 414, 423, 29 N.E.2d 1018, 1022 (1940).
68. Moss v. Central of Georgia R.R., 135 Ga. App. 904, 905, 219 S.E.2d 593, 595
(1975), (The question of whether a worker, pursuing a claim under FELA, "is an in-
dependent contractor or employee is a problem of federal law.") cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907
(1976).
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act can be appreciated in light of the fact that over 100 opinions on the
topic of product liability are published by the federal circuit courts of
appeals each year. One can assume that similar federal appellate action
will occur under a federal product liability law. These opinions will sup-
ply substantial precedent and evidence for application in product liabil-
ity actions brought in state courts, resulting in uniform interpretation of
the act at the state court level. Federal courts will interpret and apply
the federal product liability act in product liability actions brought in
federal district courts. In actions which arise under federal law, the dis-
trict courts and the federal courts of appeal will not be bound by state
court decisions interpreting the federal product liability act.69 State
courts will look to this body of federal decision, as they do in applying
other federal law, and will have substantial guidance in applying the act.
The obligation of state courts to follow federal decisions when ap-
plying federal law is the converse of the "Erie Doctrine" which requires
federal courts to follow the decisions of state courts when applying state
law. 70 The Supreme Court has expressly rejected the view that "courts
of the States remain free to apply individualized local rules when called
upon to enforce . . . [that which is expressly preempted by federal
law.]" 7 1 Under the supremacy clause, state courts also will be obligated
to apply the federal court decisions interpreting the federal product lia-
bility act. Thereby, substantial uniformity in the rules of product liabil-
ity will be achieved.
Furthermore, every court applying the federal product liability act
will begin from a common statutory text employing common, easily un-
derstood terms and familiar principles. Many potential ambiguities
could be readily resolved by reference to the comprehensive legislative
history of the act as has been the case under the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
7 2
The view that state courts will establish widely dissimilar interpreta-
tions of the federal product liability act also is contrary to experience
under other federal laws in which state courts have heard claims arising
69. See Bryant v. Civiletti, 663 F.2d 286, 293 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (In a habeas corpus
proceeding challenging consecutive life sentences, the federal court noted that it need not
adopt a lower state court opinion concerning parole. In fact, "[f]ederal courts are not
even bound by the decisions of a state supreme court setting aside a state's statute on
grounds that it violated the United States Constitution."); Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F.
Supp. 1072, 1079 (D. Utah 1981) (nor is the federal district court "bound by the doctrine
of stare decisis to follow state court interpretations of federal law," in this case a Utah
Supreme Court decision), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part, 716 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd on
rehearing, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 596 (1986).
70. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
71. Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962).
72. Opponents made similar arguments about "confusions" prior to adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judici-
ary on Federal Rules of Evidence H.R. 5463, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 80, 82, 96 (1974) (state-
ments of James S. Schaeffer and Joseph A. Moore for Association of Trial Lawyers of
America and statement of George A. Spiegelberg on behalf of American College of Trial
Lawyers and Ad Hoc Association of Trial Lawyers of America, respectively). As far as we
know, after a decade of operation, no one has seriously suggested repealing the statutory
rules and returning to "the common law."
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under those federal laws. For example, to the best of these authors'
knowledge, there is no evidence today that claims brought under
FELA73 or under section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations
Act of 194774 are treated much differently if they are brought in a state
court. These claims are treated similarly regardless of whether they are
brought in a state or federal court. Even if there is some diversity of
views regarding application of a federal product liability statute, a com-
prehensive federal law still will be an immense improvement over the
myriad of contradictory laws and standards that currently exists in the
different states. Federal product liability legislation will unquestionably
bring more stability than exists in the current system.
VII. WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED WITH FEDERAL PRODUCT
LIABILITY LEGISLATION?
There are several fundamental objectives that can be achieved in
any federal product liability legislation. The foremost goal is to remove
the unpredictability and uncertainty of the current system so as to make
it more efficient in terms of manufacturers understanding their legal ob-
ligations and the scope of their liability. 75 A second goal is to eliminate
the excessive legal costs resulting from the present system.
Unless underwriters can predict with some degree of certainty when
and how manufacturers and product sellers will be held liable, insurer
problems with the system are going to continue and fester. The rules
should specify when a defendant will be liable for his failure to safely
design a product and when he will be liable for his failure to warn.
Under tort law, the only rational basis for such rules is fault. If one
holds a manufacturer strictly or absolutely liable in the design or warn-
ing area, one creates an open-ended legal system that is unpredictable
and unaffordable. This is because a person can always design a better
product if he spends enough money. For example, one can make a car
that floats on water. One can always provide a new warning with hind-
sight as one's guide. A manufacturer should be liable when he has failed
to act in a reasonably prudent manner and either knew or should have
known about the risks. 76 Rules with respect to duty to warn are particu-
larly important - guidance is needed. Rules can spell out quickly and
unequivocally who should be warned. For example, a pharmaceutical
company should be required to warn a physician about prescription
product risks. It may be questionable, however, whether the same phar-
maceutical company should be required to give identical complex medi-
73. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
75. See REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTA-
TION, ON THE PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM ACT, S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1986).
76. See, e.g., Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 116 Mich. App. 466, 365 N.W.2d 176, 187
(1984) (cause for negligent design of forklift failed where jury found that "the manufac-
turer took reasonable care in light of any reasonably foreseeable use of the product which
might cause harm or injury").
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cal terminology to a patient. Today, the duty-to-warn area of law is
filled with uncertainty. Legislation can create rationality and
predictability.
2. Abolish the Unfair Doctrine of Joint and Several Liability
One of the major causes of unpredictability in the product liability
system is the rule of "joint and several liability." Originally, this rule
applied when there were two or more persons, acting in concert, who
wrongfully pursued a common scheme or plan that was likely to result in
injury to another. 77 In effect, joint and several liability meant that the
persons who acted in concert were equally at fault and jointly responsi-
ble for the harm, and thus the injured person could recover damages
from any one of them. 78 Currently, courts in many states have expanded
this rule by applying it even when the defendants in the lawsuit acted
independently and were not equally at fault. 7 9 The result is that a de-
fendant who is minimally responsible for causing a harm may be forced
to pay the entire amount of the injured person's damages. 80 An injured
person may choose to sue a particular defendant who is, for example,
only five percent at fault, merely because that defendant has the "deep-
est pocket." Meanwhile, the parties who are primarily responsible for
the harm - but frequently unable to pay - get off without paying
anything.
It is difficult enough for an insurer to predict the potential liability
of its own insured, but it is impossible to predict the liability for other
persons which may be assumed by its insured through the application of
joint and several liability.
Common sense says that it is simply unfair to make one person pay
for what another person did; nevertheless, that is exactly what the doc-
trine ofjoint and several liability does. Other than a basis for letting us
find a "deep pocket," how can we justify making Peter pay for the torts
of Paul? Courts today are able to and do apportion damages among
plaintiffs and defendants, and among defendants, when they are suing
each other. It is only logical and reasonable to limit the individual liabil-
ity of a person to his own share of responsibility.
3. Reduce Excessive Legal Costs
The uncertainties in tort law have helped generate tremendous and
unnecessary legal costs in product liability. Statistics clearly show that
77. See generally 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAw OF TORTS § 10.1 (2d ed.
1986).
78. Id.
79. See S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 68-69 (1986). It should be noted, how-
ever, that a growing number of states have abolished the doctrine of joint and several
liability through legislative action. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (Supp. 1986);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1983).
80. See Granelli, The Attack on Joint and Several Liability, 71 A.B.A. J. 61 (1985). For a
more detailed critique of the joint and several liability doctrine see Pressler & Schieffer,
Joint and Several Liability: A Case For Reform, supra pp. 651-84.
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victims are getting less than one-half of all the money spent on tort liti-
gation, with the rest of the money going to attorneys' fees and the costs
of litigation. 8 ' But uncertainties in tort law are not the only factors
which contribute to unnecessary legal costs. There are also unreasona-
ble and unneeded delays by some defendants' attorneys. There are friv-
olous and unwarranted claims brought by some plaintiffs' attorneys.
The federal product liability bill contains a provision that applies strict
sanctions against attorneys who bring frivolous claims or engage in un-
necessary delay.8 2 While this is a good start, the frivolous claims provi-
sion is unlikely to work if there are no rules or guidelines concerning
when a manufacturer or product seller is to be held liable. Attorneys
will be deterred from bringing frivolous claims and defenses only if they
have clear rules as to standards of liability. In addition, without clear
standards of liability, courts will have no guidelines to determine
whether sanctions should be imposed on an attorney bringing a particu-
lar case.
VIII. THE ANTI-CONSUMER MYTH
It has been asserted that some very early versions of federal product
liability legislation, in effect, "tilted the law" toward defendants. 83 That
"tilt" has long since passed. The current legislation, in a number of
ways, expands liability of manufacturers. One example which would work
to the plaintiff's advantage is the statute of limitations - which begins
to run at the time a person knew or should have known about a harm
and its cause, 84 as contrasted with the law of some states where a claim
arises as soon as a person is injured.
8 5
More importantly, rules that limit recovery are not automatically
"anti-consumer." If there are excessive costs in the system, consumers
are harmed by the corresponding increases in the price of products. To-
day, according to some surveys, product liability accounts for over
twenty percent of the price of a step ladder, 8 6 and approximately
$80,000 of the price of a general aviation airplane. 87 In the legislative
81. A recent study by the Rand Corporation shows that a successful plaintiff in a prod-
uct liability lawsuit receives approximately 45% of the total annual cost of tort litigation,
with attorneys' fees, court costs and the value of the litigants' time consuming the rest.
INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST SIX PROGRAM YEARS 23 (1986).
82. S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 305 (1986).
83. See Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Consumer of the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, on S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 128 (1982) (statement by
David I. Greenberg, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America).
84. S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 304(a) (1986).
85. See, e.g., Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So. 2d 516 (Ala. 1979) (statute of limitations
began to run at time of first legal injury, that is, when one was entitled to maintain an
action); Wojcik v. Almase, 451 N.E.2d 336 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (statute of limitations
began on date defective catheter broke off in plaintiff's body, not on date its presence was
discovered by x-ray); New Mexico Elec. Serv. Co. v. Montanez, 89 N.M. 278, 551 P.2d 634
(1976) (statue of limitations in personal injury case began to run at time of injury, not time
of the negligent act).
86. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at VI-16.
87. See 132 CONG. REC. S13,016 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1986) (statements of Senators
Nancy L. Kassebaum and Robert Dole).
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process in Washington, D.C., professional consumer groups are often
seen pitted against business groups, but that picture is not a true reflec-
tion of businesses and consumers in the United States of America. We
all have an interest in removing excessive costs from the tort system. A
recent Louis Harris poll showed that sixty-nine percent of consumers
believe the tort system has made it too easy for people to sue and win. 88
Consumers do not wish to pay inflated prices for products because some
people misuse products, drive while they are intoxicated, do not follow
instructions, or alter equipment, and then are hurt. It is ironic that pro-
fessional consumer groups oppose reforms that would eliminate liability
of manufacturers when there has been an unreasonable or unforesee-
able misuse of a product.
On another point, it does not make economic sense for the tort sys-
tem to pay people who have already been paid by health accident insur-
ance. The collateral source rule, however, precludes the introduction of
evidence before the jury showing that the plaintiff has already been com-
pensated by collateral sources for the same harm. 89 This rule permits
double recovery and contributes to the excessive costs of the product
liability system.
Finally, the Louis Harris poll suggests that most consumers think
there should be some limit on liability at least with respect to
noneconomic costs (essentially, non-medical costs). 90 While the limit is
arbitrary, no matter what level is set, it is even more arbitrary to leave
noneconomic damages - damages that have no market value - totally
open-ended.
In sum, the idea that any tort reform legislation is automatically
anti-consumer is a myth. The current proposed federal legislation con-
tains provisions that will benefit consumers, attempts to remove exces-
sive costs from the product liability system - costs which eventually are
passed onto consumers in the increased price of products - and at-
tempts to restore fairness to the system.
CONCLUSION
Two major product liability crises 9 1 have occurred in the past dec-
ade. Their impacts are not merely grist for academic musings-they are
very real. They put small businesses out of business. They blunt the
introduction of new and useful products. They compromise our efforts
88. See 132 CONG. REC. S7,604-5 (daily ed. June 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. Robert
W. Kasten) (reporting contents of Harris Survey 1986, June 9, 1986).
89. See, e.g., Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1,465 P.2d 61, 84
Cal. Rptr. 173, 175 (1970).
90. 132 CONG. REC. S7,605. The Harris poll disclosed that 65% of those persons
surveyed were in favor of a $150,000 limit on the amount that a person could collect for
any injury, provided, that if that person needed special medical treatment they could get it
free for the rest of their life no matter what the cost. Id. (emphasis added).
91. The two crises are the 1976-78 period which produced the FINAL REPORT, supra
note 2, and the present one which prompted the Product Liability Reform Act, supra note
59.
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to meet foreign competition, and they create unnecessary costs in the
price of products. In sum, they have adverse impacts on both consumers
and businesses.
The crises have had two basic forces that nudge them forward:
overly subjective insurance rate-making and unpredictable tort law.
Congress has partially addressed the insurance rate-making problem by
facilitating self-insurance for all product sellers and manufacturers. For-
tunately, Congress has now taken an active interest in the second aspect
of the problem - unpredictable tort law. Although a bill progressed in
the 99th Congress farther than any bills have before, the time for further
study should be over. The plaintiffs' lobby has consistently opposed
federal product liability legislation both in concept and in substance.
While the organized plaintiff's bar attempts to couch its position in
terms of the interests of consumers, evidence such as the recent Louis
Harris poll shows that this plaintiffs' lobby does not accurately reflect
public opinion on this issue.9 2 All interested groups should join to-
gether to assure that the federal legislation is fair and balanced. To
leave the system in common law chaos is simply to perpetuate unneces-
sary crises. The time to enact uniform federal product liability stan-
dards is now.
92. In fact, the survey showed that the public believes "that lawyers looking for big
contingency fees are responsible for what is seen as the flood of liability suits." 132 CONG.
REC. S7,605 (daily ed. June 16, 1986).
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